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The Question of Re-turning 
Toward or Away from the Virtual? 
Sanja Dejanovic 
Trent University 
In an interview “On Philosophy” included in Negotiations (1995), Gilles 
Deleuze remarks: “I’ve tried in all my books to discover the nature of events; 
it’s a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the verb ‘to be’ 
and attributes.”1 It is by now generally understood that the nature of events 
are central to Deleuze’s philosophical endeavour. This has not meant, 
however, that the process mapped out by this concept has been adequately 
grasped. Indeed, the lines mapping out events are obscured, theoretical, 
even otherworldly, whenever the complexities of the creating of the virtual 
and the actual as the created, are reductively conceived as giving way to two 
separated domains; two separated domains whereby the repeater would be 
forever condemned to be the result of an otherworldly will that “works 
through it,” one that would signal that they would never be capable of 
becoming worthy of the events that make a life.2 The perspectival reality of 
the virtual with respect to the actual, which despite its fragmentary nature is 
in its entirety encompassed in each singular event, requires of us that we 
grasp what it is that Antonin Artaud’s points to when saying, I “am my son, 
my father, my mother, and myself.” It is not as though events perceived in 
the form of a virtual complex render beings inconsequential; instead, events 
are capable of ousting the verb “to be” in a double sense, because they 
enfold what is most affirmative in the activity of beings, the being of 
becoming whereby a life is born, always yet again, and as a function of 
which, as Alfred North Whitehead notes, what an actual being is, is how 
that entity becomes. It is adequate to its becoming. The actual as present-
being expresses the verb “to be” in an ephemeral sense, or it is expressed by 
it in a restrictive way, while when affirmed as indistinct from the virtual, 
being, the verb “to be,” implies nothing else than the return of becoming. It 
is an untimely instant in which what is affirmed is the continuation of 
becoming; an instant that makes each event be the infinite becoming-finite of 
an actual being. So as to explore the nature of events in Deleuze’s 
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philosophy, it is this displacement, the ousting of the verb “to be,” that I 
focus in on in this paper. 
The ousting of the verb “to be” is owed most of all to Nietzsche’s 
eternal return, which has a prominent place in Deleuze’s philosophy as the 
empty form of time, what he calls a pure event enfolded in every event, since 
it is with respect to it that all time unfolds simultaneously. It unfolds as a 
double movement that defines the nature of events, one that is taken up in 
the title of this paper under the guidance of the question, toward or away 
from the virtual. As we will see, the being of the question does not play a 
trivial role in the nature of events, rather, it is a threshold, a borderline, a 
frontier, marking a differentiation that opens up the double movement 
enfolded in each event. Indeed, without the being of the question, which, as 
noted, signals the return of differentiation,3 what we would be left with is 
the being of the past, the ground of actuals, which appears to uphold a 
duality of the virtual and the actual. To be installed in, or to turn toward the 
being of the past, does not mean that the nature of events has been secured. 
The being of the past, as Deleuze tells us, is vulnerable to becoming 
appropriated by representational models which reinforce the verb “to be.” 
This is precisely why the nature of events must be sought after from the 
perspective of a re-turning, which I have framed here as one of orientation 
toward or away from the virtual for the purposes of pointing to the double 
directionality of events. In other words, with the question, I am emphasizing 
two simultaneous yet dissymmetrical processes in Deleuze’s philosophy, the 
actualization of the virtual which is reflected in the ground as the potential 
of a singularized event, and the counter-actualization of the virtual, with 
respect to which the status of the actual becomes otherwise. It is not as 
though one of these processes is the correct one, while the other one illusory. 
Rather, this double optics, the turn from one to the other, is decisive in the 
discovery of the nature of events. Of course, the being of the question 
expressed as the question of re-turning invokes much more than this; it 
invokes a selective test, one in which to turn toward the virtual, yet again, is 
to comprehend that which is repeated in the repetition of the virtual events 
of the past. It is to grasp how it is that the nature of all events, this event too, 
can be adequately conceived from the perspective of the pure event itself. 
What is conceived is the double movement, the double optics, to and from 
the virtual, which defines events, and displaces the verb “to be” in both of 
the senses discussed.  
This double optics has not only been the abiding source of the 
philosophical endeavour, it is also the terrain that gives way to much 
dispute preoccupying thinkers. As I have noted, the questioning, which 
properly speaking invokes a re-turning, has been traditionally posited in the 
form of the question, what is the object=x. Or, to take one reference point, 
Husserl posits such questioning as a reorientation of vision, as a shedding 
light on how an object becomes determinable from the perspective of the 
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noematic complex, once the stream of consciousness has been exhausted in 
copulative spontaneity.4 Said otherwise, the re-turning, to which 
questioning most intimately belongs, presents the instance in which the 
horizon of grounding prompts another optics; one that does not simply 
expose what a being is but how it becomes determinable to begin with. We 
might even say, at the least with respect to Deleuze’s philosophy, that with 
re-turning, the question of the how not only takes precedence, but that it 
exposes the nullity of the question what is x posited for itself. As mentioned, 
Whitehead is admired as a philosopher of the event by Deleuze, precisely 
because for him, “how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual 
entity is.”5 Such an articulation in which the how has primacy, only becomes 
possible with the reversal or inversion of the processes that seem to 
correspond to these questions. By turning to Nietzsche, Deleuze effectuates 
such a reversal when claiming that what can be said of being is becoming, or 
that being is itself becoming. This is the univocity of being. The problem 
here, as we will see in the first section of this paper, is that the eternal return, 
which is the heart of the event, must at once be continuation and moment. In 
other words, the displacement of the verb “to be” hinges on the articulation 
of the eternal return as continuity of becoming, and the break in the stream 
of the coming-to-be. Once I have explored this core aspect of Deleuze’s 
ontology, I will delve into the double lines of articulation, the movements 
toward and away from the virtual that define the nature of events, by 
placing the emphasis on the syntheses of time. Since time is not internal to 
beings, but beings are internal to time, it is only from the perspective of the 
flow of time that we can manage to think how a being becomes what it is, 
without reducing such a being to an identity that subjugates it in actuality.  
 
Ousting the Verb “to be” with Nietzsche 
To adequately conceive of the creating of the virtual and the actual as the 
created, one need be equipped with a comprehension of the univocity of 
being that Deleuze furthers. According to him, the three thinkers in the 
history of philosophy that have advanced the univocity of being are Duns 
Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche. Indeed, Spinoza charts one of the best 
planes of immanence precisely because he does not hand over immanence to 
anything transcendent.6 However, as he notes in Difference and Repetition 
(1968), while Spinoza affirms univocal being, it is Nietzsche who effectively 
realizes it with the eternal return. His rationale for favoring Nietzsche’s 
approach with respect to the univocal being is clearly delineated in that text, 
where he writes: “There still remains a difference between substance and the 
modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the 
modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than 
themselves. Substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the 
modes.”7 It is said of the modes, and, is in turn, made inconsequential, 
insofar as it is expressed in the form of Nietzsche’s eternal return. In other 
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words, all creating of the virtual must be approached from the perspective of 
the eternal return, which is the pulse of Deleuze’s philosophical endeavour. 
What I intend to do here is to show how Nietzsche’s eternal return realizes 
the univocity of being, by focusing in on the role Nietzsche plays in 
Deleuze’s efforts to displace the verb to be. While I cannot take up Deleuze’s 
overturning of Platonism here, it is the common root that binds him to 
Nietzsche in his endeavour to displace the verb to be. Equally, whether or 
not Nietzsche actually overturned Platonism, being Heidegger’s question, is 
something I cannot consider.8 In what way does Nietzsche, however, set out 
to overturn Platonism, or, more specifically, the antinomy of being and 
becoming? In “The Overturning of Platonism and the New Meaning of 
Appearance,” Michael Haar presents the sequential development of the 
problem in Nietzsche’s thought. In some of his earliest writings, Nietzsche 
seeks to displace the notion of the true world by praising the life lived 
amongst appearance: “My philosophy, Platonism overturned: the further 
one moves away from true being, the purer, the more beautiful, the better it 
is; Life in the midst of appearance as goal.”9 But in affirming appearance, 
Haar asks, doesn’t Nietzsche nevertheless maintain the antinomy, for what 
else could appearance be but illusion? Doesn’t a life in the midst of 
appearances reinforce nihilism which revert us to the true being? 
Nietzsche’s answer in The Twilight of Idols is a definite no: “We have rid 
ourselves of the true world: what world are we left with? Perhaps that of 
appearances? […] But no! Along with the true world, we have also rid 
ourselves of the apparent world.”10 Perhaps it is not even a question of 
overturning the Platonic antinomy, but more so, as Nietzsche notes, of 
unlearning it. Isn’t the one who is capable of living life amidst appearances, 
skimming the surface or skin depth of things, the one who has indeed 
unlearned it? Once we put aside the antinomy, what do we have left? We 
have a being whose goal is the willing of the endless return of appearing. No 
longer resenting the passage of time, only such a being is capable of 
extracting a form from chaos. “To impress upon becoming the character of 
being—this is the highest form of the will to power. […] That everything 
returns—here a world of becoming comes closest to the world of being.”11 
To realize Nietzsche’s eternal return which impresses the mark of being 
upon becoming, the antinomy must be unlearned. 
 Nietzsche recognizes the doctrine of eternal return in Stoic teachings, 
who according to him had inherited the concept from Heraclitus. Nietzsche, 
for whom Heraclitus plays the role that he himself plays in Deleuze’s 
philosophy, claims that the Stoics had made an “old song” of the eternal 
return. One can turn to his early work, “Philosophy in the Tragic of the 
Greeks,” in order to grasp the comparison that I have drawn. In that piece, 
Nietzsche contrasts Anaximander, who had left coming-to-be in the 
indefinite, to Heraclitus who did away entirely with the duality of indefinite 
being and definite beings, by cancelling being altogether as separate from 
the world of becoming. The aim of the two Hellenistic philosophies is 
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different, one inquiring into the passing of beings as a sort of atonement for 
having separated from being, the other testifying to the innocence of 
existence, of the becoming of beings. A fragment demonstrating Heraclitus’ 
position is too interesting for us to skip over for the sake of brevity: “I see 
nothing other than becoming. Be not deceived. It is the fault of your myopia, 
not of the nature of things, if you believe you see land somewhere in the 
ocean of coming-to-be and passing away.”12 But if there is not such land in 
the ocean of coming-to-be, in what way can the eternal return express that 
being is becoming? Heraclitus notes that becoming is like the “everlasting 
wave beat and rhythm of things. And what did I see? [I saw] lawful order, 
unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness.”13 For Heraclitus, this 
eternal coming-to-be expresses nothing but the world of play, the innocence 
of creating and dissolving a form, so that we may create once again by 
starting the game anew. “In this world only play, play as artists and children 
engage in it, exhibit coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and 
destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence. […] 
Such is the game that the aeon plays with itself.”14 We can now see why 
Nietzsche thought that the Stoics, like Zarathustra’s caricature, had made an 
old song of the eternal return. For him, the Stoics had already made a useful 
doctrine of it; they evaluated the doctrine for the purpose of conceiving a 
morality. And so, he writes, that the Stoics misinterpreted Heraclitus, 
“dragging down his basically aesthetic perception of cosmic play to signify a 
vulgar consideration for the world’s useful ends.”15 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), Deleuze returns to Heraclitus as 
Nietzsche’s precursor, so as to elucidate what the affirmation of becoming 
implies, what it means to affirm becoming, and what is affirmed in 
becoming. The fundamental problem is how to articulate becoming without 
referring it to something transcendent that would dictate its movement. As 
Nietzsche frames it, how can we impress the character of being on becoming 
without returning to the duality of appearance and essence? Taking up this 
concern, Deleuze writes: 
In the first place, it is doubtless to say there is only becoming. No 
doubt it is also to affirm becoming. But we also affirm the being of 
becoming we say that becoming affirms being or that being is 
affirmed in becoming. Heraclitus has two thoughts which are like 
ciphers: according to one there is no being, everything is becoming; 
according to the other, being is the being of becoming as such. A 
working thought which affirms becoming and a contemplative thought 
which affirms the being of becoming. […] For there is no being 
beyond becoming […]; becoming is the affirmation of being.16  
That being is becoming means nothing more than that being cannot be 
conceived of as separate from becoming, it is becoming as such. In what 
sense is it becoming? Deleuze argues that only in its returning is being 
becoming.17 In being affirmed of becoming, being is affirmed for-itself as the 
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repetition of becoming. There are two affirmations, or the doubling of 
affirmation, involved in the realization of the eternal return: the affirmation 
of becoming and the affirmation of the being of becoming. The two are not 
separate. When we say along with Deleuze that becoming is affirmed and 
then that the being of becoming is in turn affirmed, we do not mean that this 
is their order of production, even if it is their order of presentation. As I will 
soon show, the eternal return as the synthesis of time that works in reverse 
forms a single becoming.  
Because in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883) and other works, Nietzsche 
refers to the eternal return as a tortuous circle, how is the return of becoming 
itself not the return of the identical? This is the question to which Difference 
and Repetition, right to its concluding arguments, serves as a response. The 
whole of the philosophy of difference is compromised if Deleuze is unable to 
demonstrate how the eternal return breaks the vicious circle of the return to 
the identical to then form a line or, as Nietzsche calls it, the “supreme 
constellation of being.” It is not as though philosophies that affirm the 
identity of the absolute, namely Hegel, do not conceive of such a 
constellation of being. The problem is precisely that Hegel, from the 
perspective of Deleuze’s thought, imprisons himself in his logic. He cancels 
the gaping abyss or formlessness in order to affirm the identity of the 
concept. In his defence of the Hegelian position in “Limit, Ground, 
Judgement… Syllogism: Hegel, Deleuze, Hegel and Deleuze,” Jay Lampert 
argues that Deleuze reduces the Hegelian ground to the Leibnizian notion of 
convergence, when the ground is “the source of still more difference.”18 The 
problem for Deleuze is not that Hegel appears to have conceived of 
difference as sort of convergence as Leibniz had done, neither is the idea that 
the absolute realizes itself with ever more difference put into question by 
him, since the ground is indeed the rendering infinite of the concept, so 
requiring ever more differentiations. The point is that, the ground as “still 
more difference” does not save Hegel from a Deleuzean critique. It is instead 
the basis of such a critique. It is not enough to extend the ground in order to 
demonstrate how difference works on its terrain. What Hegel calls 
contradiction is radically reformulated in Deleuze’s philosophy as the 
moment of differentiation, expressed in the questioning instance, what 
difference is there; a difference that pertains to the movement from one level of 
repetition to another. For Deleuze, difference does not “resolve itself” in the 
ground as it does in Hegel. It is primary, meaning that it is the moment of 
groundlessness showing itself in the ground as erecting the ground itself. 
The entirety of the process of erecting the ground from the perspective of 
groundlessness presents the difference; it is the singular event itself in the 
making. The so-called higher position for Deleuze does not involve “reaching 
the infinite” of contradiction, or raising difference to contradiction. What is 
this higher moment but the affirmation of absolute knowledge, the 
realization of the dialectical logic itself in the concept, in which the essence 
of the finite is said from the perspective of the infinite?  
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There is a significant reversal of this moment in Deleuze’s philosophy. 
This moment is not a preservation of what came before. It is not a raising up. 
It is a releasing in the highest affirmation in which the difference is made. 
This is why Deleuze claims that “difference is light, aerial and affirmative. 
To affirm is not to bear but, on the contrary, to discharge and to lighten.”19 
In other words, when we claim that Hegel seems to have closed the circle, or 
that he reduces difference rather than raising it up to a higher position in 
contradiction, we are arguing alongside Deleuze that the dialectical circle 
saves the whole in a “gigantic memory;” that the ground is the “power of 
memory” which carries “the average forms to infinity.”20 In the place of the 
selection of difference on the basis of re-presentation, Deleuze argues for a 
repetition that would affirm the “formless power of the ground.”21 In 
contrast to representation, “repetition is the formless being of all differences, 
the formless power of the ground which carries every object to the extreme 
‘form’ in which its representation comes undone.”22 But doesn’t this mean 
that difference is left undetermined? This is precisely what Lampert asks in 
the concluding his paper. He writes:  
If each determination if already a difference, then making it 
different will not negate it. But does this mean that difference has 
no determinate content? If each determination were a general 
‘mixture’ […], then while the upside would be that identity [is] lost, 
the downside would be that so was difference. But if differences are 
indeed determinate, why not call them negative? After all, they 
would override boundaries, flee constraints, abstract from 
properties, become-other, etc.23  
In The Logic of Sense (1969), Deleuze warns against this sort of 
interpretation of difference when noting: 
What is common to metaphysics and transcendental philosophy is, 
above all, this alternative which they both impose on us: either an 
undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or 
an abyss without difference and without properties, or a supremely 
individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form. Without 
this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos.24  
Deleuze is not satisfied with expressing difference under the concept. 
Neither is he willing to leave difference indeterminate. The difference made 
in the doubled affirmation, what he calls the eternal return, is the ground 
made from the perspective of groundlessness, not the other way around. It is 
a reversal, a kind of turning inside out of the surface, in which identity is 
said of difference, groundlessness as raising the ground, and determination 
as both determination and indetermination at once. Having highlighted that 
Hegel is according to Deleuze unable to do away with the vicious circle, 
since his dialectical logic cancels the gaping abyss, formlessness, let us 
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return to the doubling of affirmation. As though addressing Hegel, 
Nietzsche writes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:  
‘Behold,’ I continued, ‘this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a 
long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must 
not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not 
whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed 
before? And if everything has been there before—what do you 
think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been 
there before? And are not all things knotted together so firmly that 
this moment draws after it all that is to come? Therefore—itself too? 
For whatever can walk—in this long lane out there too, it must walk 
once more.25  
There are two affirmations in Nietzsche formulation of the eternal return: it 
is continuation and moment, the two being synonymous with the double 
affirmation of becoming and the being of becoming. The difficulty of 
articulating the eternal return as embracing these simultaneous 
temporalities is evident in Deleuze’s colloquium on Nietzsche when he 
inquires:  
How does one explain that [the eternal return] is both cycle and 
moment: on the one hand continuation; and on the other, iteration? 
One the one hand, a continuation of the process of becoming which 
is the World; and on the other, repetition, lightning flash, a mystical 
view on this process or this becoming? On the one hand, the 
continual re-beginning of what has been; and on the other, the 
instantaneous return of a kind of intense focal point, to a ‘zero’ 
moment of the will?26  
There are two ways in which these two directions of the eternal return are 
explained, which, nevertheless amount to the same thing. In the first place, 
as Nietzsche writes, when one says “yes to a single moment [they] say yes to 
all of existence.”27 To say yes to a single moment, means not only to affirm 
that which has been, but to will it yet again without dwelling in the past. 
Listen to Heraclitus’ dictum, there is no land in the ocean of becoming. This 
willing is always oriented towards the future, the moment is itself conceived 
as the creation of the world anew. This is tragic joy. Once a form has been 
found, it must be lost to the abyss, because a being that says yes to becoming, 
cannot will anything other than the continuation of such becoming. Therein is its 
ethical decision. The ring must be a broken one, lest we appropriate beings 
to not-being, which would be violent. Deleuze too joins continuation and 
moment together when arguing that the eternal return is the repetition of the 
future. All of time unfolds as a function of the caesura, being itself the 
moment that decenters the circle. How does Deleuze show this?  
In joining peak and abyss, Nietzsche formulated a paradoxical logic in 
which chaos and necessity are both affirmed, their thought together being 
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conditional upon the circle itself being a broken one.28 If amor fati or the love 
of destiny is affirmed in the eternal return, this is only from the perspective 
of a chance point that gathers the degrees of being in a supreme 
constellation. The chance point of pure affirmation is the “the celestial 
necessity that forces even chance events to dance in stellar formation.”29 
Deleuze interprets Nietzsche’s events as degrees of intensive quantities or 
differences, which, from one to the other, form the continuous variation of 
the constellation of being. This constellation is not presented all at once, but 
repeatedly differentiated from one degree to another, from one intensive 
difference through all the degrees which repeat one another. Each of these 
degrees of being as repetitions or virtual events as such, are themselves cuts 
in the continuity that also present, move toward, the actualized of the virtual 
in adjacent fields. In being bound to repeat that which is singular to a life, 
the repetition of the different degrees of being, is the in-itself of the past, the 
ground. Throughout Difference and Repetition Deleuze will refer to the 
presentment of the degrees of being as a sort of effect, “like an optical effect, 
or rather the erotic effect of memory itself.”30 Only once this constellation 
becomes a “freeze-frame”, once it is exhausted, does a simulated sense 
become articulable (what Husserl will frame as copulative spontaneity).31 
This freeze-frame is again discussed by Deleuze and Felix Guattari in What is 
Philosophy? (1991), with the two arguing that science “relinquishes the 
infinite, infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualize the virtual. 
[…] In the case of science it is like a freeze-frame. It is a fantastic slowing 
down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought 
able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.”32 Said in other words, 
the exhaustion of the constellation of events that compose the virtual give 
way to a simulated sense, an articulation of what an actual entity is. In The 
Logic of Sense, Deleuze rightly points out that such an articulation takes the 
form of the infinitive verb, which becomes conjugated with respect to 
individuals, persons, and cases.33 Here is it relevant to inquire, however, by 
what necessity “form” emerges from chaos, and not merely that it has 
emerged as such. A swift answer would be that it emerges by the same 
necessity that the whole of the constellation itself arises.  
As that which unfolds the line or constellation of being, the eternal 
return is the formlessness which insinuates itself in the form that it creates. 
Once becoming is itself affirmed (the virtual actualized), the eternal return 
“comes back and flows back through all the modifications,” showing itself 
as that which is repeated in all of the degrees of being, as their reason for 
differentiation.34 By being that which is repeated in each repetition of 
difference, it is, according to Deleuze, the differentiator that causes “chance 
events to dance in a stellar formation.” This sort of re-turning has an 
intimate relation to questioning. As with Heidegger, Deleuze makes the 
question be the central point of the inversion of the look away from the 
tracing of the virtual elements and their lines of actualizations. The turn 
away from actualization with the exhaustion of the constellation, arises as 
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the question what difference is there? For Deleuze, this question marks the 
movement from one repetition to another, but we could also say that it arises 
once the being of the past and actuals appear to present a sort of dualism 
with respect to which the status of the actual is put into question. The actual 
is not strictly speaking completely determined by the virtual elements 
presented in the being of the past, nor is it then merely that which is 
actualized; hence the emergence of the question, what difference is there, 
which would otherwise be what is the object=x. But the question what 
difference is there to which the higher instance of thought corresponds is 
precisely the question how does a being become, precisely because the 
question places us at the center of differentiation. It is with the questioning 
instance that the look is inverted, shedding light on the becoming of beings, 
which is, according  Deleuze, “pure virtuality [that] no longer has to 
actualize itself, since it is a strict correlate of the actual with which it forms 
the tightest circuit.”35 This reversal of the look upon the virtual events anew 
marks the return of difference, the un-grounding of the ground, on the basis 
of which the continuation of the becoming of beings is open for affirmation. 
But doesn’t the eternal return then lend its affirmation to the same form of 
becoming? Why does it dissolve the form in showing itself as the 
differentiator of the constellation? Here is where Deleuze’s thought exposes 
the re-turning, thinking that which is supremely elusive:  
There is eternal return in the third time (the repeated, the future, 
repeats itself): it is here that the freeze-frame begins to move once 
more, or that the straight line of time, as though drawn by its own 
length, reforms a strange loop which in no way resembles the 
earlier cycle, but leads into the formless, and operates only for the 
third time and for that which belongs to it.36  
According to Deleuze, in tracing the field of virtual events we become equal 
to the potentials of the past, but the past or the second repetition only arises 
by virtue of that which is repeated each time, the future. This means that the 
repetition of the past happens “once and for all,” it shall never return in its 
specific configuration. It is in this sense that everything which is said of 
becoming is contingent, it does not occur outside of the differential relations 
of living beings. As that which causes becoming to return, the eternal return, 
however, “returns for all times, for eternity.”37 What returns for all eternity 
is the yet-to-come, “the becoming-identical of becoming itself” on the basis 
of the different.38 The identical as continuation is second principle, principle 
become, because it revolves around the different. This reversal is grasped by 
Deleuze as the pure event, an event which displaces the verb to be, all the 
while reinforcing the notion that the simulated sense articulated must itself 
be expressed as a becoming, which, in turn, itself as verb, displaces the 
identity of the present-being at hand. The ousting of the verb to be in the 
double sense is thus, effectively realized with Nietzsche’s eternal return. 
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To and From the Virtual: The Double Sense of Becoming 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that the present is a contraction 
of a certain level of the past, with respect to which the present always 
produces something novel. No two presents are identical, as each present is 
the maximal contraction of a different level of the past. The contractions of 
different levels explain why the instants of the first synthesis themselves 
differ. “What we live empirically as a succession of different presents from 
the point of view of active synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of 
levels of the past within passive synthesis. Each present contracts a level of 
the whole.”39 The difference between the instants, then, manifests the 
coexistence of the different levels of the past actualized in the present. We 
can only reflect upon them as different in degree on the basis of this more 
profound difference of contractions, or repetitions, that take place in the 
being of the past as a whole. Conversely, if we install ourselves in the being 
of the past, the past “appears as the coexistence of circles which are more or 
less dilated or contracted, each one of which contains everything at the same 
time and the present of which it is the extreme limit.”40 Leaving aside the 
coexistence of circles for the moment, we notice that the past plays itself out 
at different levels. In fact, these different levels are already implied in the 
contraction of the past in the present, but the first repetition of the present 
and the second repetition do not have the same relation to difference.41 In 
the second repetition, difference is no longer traced from one instant to the 
next. It is instead there between the different levels of the past, along with 
the lines of actualization that the past appears to have given way to (that 
which is actualized by beings). Indeed, the present is a contraction of the 
extreme limit of the past, but the ground of the past is itself composed of 
different levels that replay the same story, theme, or most appropriately, a 
life, in varying degrees. The contraction of the past therefore consists of the 
tracing of the whole of the past which coexists with itself at varying levels. 
As Deleuze claims after Henri Bergson, to be installed in the past means 
repeating the same spiritual life at varying levels, from the most relaxed to 
most contracted degree of difference. By being installed in it, we do not 
actualize a maximal level straight away. There is a sort of presentation of the 
series of levels that are selected to form the maximal level of potential. To 
say that the past is presented is in a sense correct, since the ground of the 
past is populated by virtual images, singularized events, which demonstrate 
the continuous variation of the past. The past preserving itself in itself, or as 
repeated at different levels, shows us how the “manner in which each [past 
event] continues the whole life, but at a different level or degree on the basis 
of a past which was never present.” 42 Or, as Deleuze also writes, 
“everything happens as if our memories were repeated an indefinite number 
of times in these thousands and thousands of possible reduction of our past 
life.”43 As mentioned earlier, the repetition of a life at difference levels is 
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referred to as destiny by Deleuze, while the selection of the level played out 
defines our freedom.44 The choice of the level is nevertheless not decided 
from the perspective of the past. We turn towards the past with respect to 
the future.  
 Thus far I pointed out that the past is what is and that it replays a life, 
but what is this being of the past? Is the being of the past one and the same 
thing as my personal past, my life? It would be a mistake for us to assume 
that the being of the past is my personal memory, as this would reduce 
ontological duration to psychological duration, the virtual being part of the 
brain, or the duration of a single being. In Bergsonism (1988), Deleuze 
proposes that because there are indeed durations that exist outside of us 
simultaneously as our own, our consciousness cannot account for the way in 
which things experience duration.45 Bergson claims that “there is some 
inexpressible reason in them which accounts for our inability to examine them 
at successive moments of our own duration.”46 But the idea that there are 
diverse durations at the same time as my own, does not in any way tell us 
that beings are merely closed in on themselves. If duration belongs to things 
as much as it is attributed to my consciousness, then, for Deleuze, 
psychological duration must open onto an ontological duration in which all 
beings would participate.47 In the place of several durations, we now have 
the single time of an ontological duration. The problem with ontological 
duration, however, is that beings continue to experience time in divergent 
ways. Deleuze, therefore, asks: “In what sense can one get beyond the 
ontological alternative of one/several?”48 Since the being of the past is the 
condition of experience, we must show how there is a single time in which 
things participate, how they share a singular bloc of becoming, all the while 
giving way to divergent durations. Unravelling this complexity is a great 
challenge. Our primary question whether this past is my personal past 
demonstrates one of the illusions of the ground, a projection of my duration 
onto it. Such an interpretation appears to be plausible, especially because the 
ground gives way to divergent durations, one of which is my own. Deleuze 
seems to have resolved the problem of the one or several durations in 
Difference and Repetition. In Bergsonism, however, the problem is evident 
when Deleuze expresses the following reservation: “insofar as we are 
dealing with qualitative distinct fluxes, it may in fact be difficult to know 
whether or not the two subjects live and perceive the same time: We support 
unity, but only as the most ‘plausible’ idea.”49 This reservation is legitimate 
because once we have installed the qualitatively distinct fluxes, it is difficult 
to demonstrate that beings perceive the same time. In addition to this, even 
if we say with Bergson that the brain is part of the image, rather than 
constituting the virtual images themselves, it remains unclear how this past 
is not my personal past. Deleuze’s framing of the problem shows us that he 
is carefully thinking through the relationship of the virtual and its diverging 
lines of actualization. Does actualization imply one and the same virtual for 
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divergent beings? In what follows, I will outline how the dualism of the 
one/several can be overturned. 
Allow me to briefly return to the multiple durations disclosed in the 
present. For Deleuze, these durations only appear to me because my 
duration is among others: “the flowing of the water, the flight of the bird, 
the murmur of my life form three fluxes; but only because my duration is 
one of them, and also the element that contains the two others. Why not 
make do with two fluxes, my duration and the flight of the bird, for 
example?”50 We cannot say that there are only two fluxes because their 
simultaneous existence implies that they are contained in a third duration. 
My duration makes it possible that I reflect on another that is reflected in my 
own. Their simultaneity is made possible by a third, meaning that my 
duration is reflected in another one that likewise contains the duration of the 
flight of the bird. “It is in this sense that my duration essentially has the 
power to disclose other durations, to encompass the others, and to 
encompass itself ad infinitum.”51 But these coexisting durations in the 
present only gives us the outer envelope of this third duration, after its 
division has been actualized. According to Deleuze, if we install ourselves 
directly in the virtual, there is only a single time or constellation, the third, in 
which there are no longer distinct durations. There is a convergence upon 
the same one. The time of the virtual, then, as the condition of experience, is 
not my personal memory or the memory belonging to another being, but an 
impersonal time in which a life unfolds. Deleuze noted that the ground in 
which beings participate, “no longer simply signifies my relationship with 
being, but the relationship of all things with being.”52 But what is this 
relationship with being exactly? The virtual events that play out different 
levels of the past give us what is impersonal of a relation, or alternatively, 
being is itself the bloc of becoming is the non-relation of a relation, as that 
which makes the relation be what it is. What the repetitions of the past 
shows us, then, are the continuous variations of a relation; one that varies 
with respect to itself. The being of the past is a time shared in which beings 
are enveloped; the virtual is our other half, which cannot be in any sense 
actual or lived by beings.53 This other half which implicates us does not exist 
as such but subsists or insists in the present. This is precisely what the being 
of the past must be; it must form itself as that which is in-between. Only in 
this sense could we experience another being in relation to being. Of course, 
we do not experience the duration of another being, but experience another 
only by participating in that which is internal to both durations as their 
condition. Among others, Deleuze deploys the example of the orchid and 
the wasp so as to show this bloc of becoming that is in-between yet 
irreducible to the two: “The orchid seems to form a wasp image, but in fact 
there is a wasp-becoming of the orchid, an orchid-becoming of the wasp, a 
double capture since ‘what’ each becomes changes no less than ‘that which’ 
becomes. [It is] one and the same becoming, a single bloc of becoming.”54  
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 By differentiating, the virtual gives way to actualizations. In the being 
of the past, every repetition itself produces and has produced divergent lines 
of actualizations asymmetrical in nature.55 The entirety of the ground 
prepares the dissection, the splitting of the past into divergent lines of 
actualization with the maximal contraction being actualized in the present. 
But the lines of divergence move back and forth from the ground to the 
periphery, reflecting each level of the past, or the way in which the 
differentiation is developed in actualizations.56 The latest actualization 
reflects the maximal contraction, while previous lines of actualizations give 
us what might be called my personal past. What is so fascinating about 
Deleuze’s past is precisely that each repetition is a cut in the fabric of the 
ground, at which point the past splits into two movements. In one direction, 
divergent lines are further developed in accordance with the capacity of 
each being, and give way to the actual in the present; an actual which is not 
the mere copy of the virtual. In the other direction, these diverging lines can 
be traced back to the centers of convergence of the past once the 
actualization has been made.57 “In both cases,” Deleuze writes, “the 
pathways are the same; what matters is the direction one takes them in, 
towards divergence or convergence.”58 By following one line toward 
divergence in order to shed light on the actual being, we see that this being 
is constantly displaced and differentiated with respect to itself. The 
diverging lines “show us the thing itself identical to its difference, internal 
difference identical to something.”59 If we move in the direction of the 
virtual away from the actualizations of living beings, these lines, now being 
three, converge or intersect upon the same event. Deleuze notes that, it is as 
though the  
articulations of the real and [diverging] lines were relayed back and 
forth: the articulations of the real and [diverging] lines which at 
least reveal internal differences at the limit of their convergence, 
and conversely, [diverging] lines give us articulations of the real, 
e.g. the convergence of the three diverse lines, leading to the true 
distribution of what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the 
object.60  
In the course of actualization, the being of the past appears to produce the 
difference that is developed on each side of the divergent lines, in the object 
and in the subject, but it also simultaneously turns in on itself, so as to reflect 
the divergence as though in a mirror. The tracing of the past in the direction 
of the virtual, therefore, presents us with the continuity or becoming of the 
past, the way in which it calls forth a new present in the direction of the 
future. The being of the past is hence a passive synthesis of two dimensions: 
“it spits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass 
on, while the other preserves the past,” or the passing of the present.61 In the 
process of tracing the ground, we not only see how it is that the present 
passes with the development of the lines of actualizations, but the formation 
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of the past on its own terrain as a singular time in which divergent lines 
converge. With respect to the former, the passing of the present pertains to 
that part of the event actualized in it; what Deleuze also refers to as an effect 
in the present, preserved in the past as a singularized event.  
 Let us now take this line (later called the line of flight) in the other 
direction by turning towards the virtual, rather than tracing its actualization 
in the actual which is presented as convergence in the second synthesis. It 
must be kept in mind that the entirety of this tracing culminates in an event; 
it is the event as it becomes in two directions, its singularization and 
actualization as two sides of a surface, even while the workings of the past 
have been presented prior to taking up the pure event of the third time. 
When opening the discussion of the third synthesis of time, Deleuze evokes 
Plato’s movement of the soul or learning, which involves a retrieval of what 
has been forgotten. In evoking Plato, Deleuze wants to emphasize the 
illusions that the ground is susceptible to if conceived of as operating by 
itself; by operating by itself, we mean that it constitutes the entirety of time. 
While Plato is the figure with whom the circular movement of the ground 
(model) and that which is grounded (the copies) is inaugurated, such 
illusions are, however, not delimited to Plato’s pure past. They apply to the 
workings of the past in general. It is worthwhile noting that the circular 
relationship of the ground to that which is grounded installed from Plato 
onward, “elevates the principle of representation—namely, identity, which 
it treats as an immemorial model, and resemblance, which it treats as a 
present image: the Same and the Similar.”62 The past as model merely offers 
the image in accordance with which the resemblance of the copies becomes 
measurable. If we were to follow this formulation of the pure past, we could 
not make the claim that the living organism creates anything new, only that 
it distributes the model to different degrees.  
 This problem of circularity is not delimited to such a vision of the past. 
As we saw with the brief discussion of Hegel, transcendental philosophy 
likewise encounters it when it posits the being of the past as ground in 
relation to the present, or that which is grounded in it. This sort of illusion 
appears to be permitted by the “ambiguities of Mnemosyne, [or] was 
already implicit in the second synthesis of time,” precisely because the 
events of the being of the past mark the centers of convergence of series; the 
centers around which two terms converge in a third, are the same centers 
which appear to be prolonged in lines of actualization.63 The second 
repetition reinforces the idea that the past moves in a circular fashion with 
respect to the present, and that the ground falls into what it grounds as the 
completed, because it appears as though its being is conditional upon the 
terms which implicate it. As Deleuze tells us, these repetitions  
include difference, but include it only between the degrees or 
levels. [The second repetition] appears first in the form of the circle 
of the past coexistent in themselves [convergences]; then in the 
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form of the circle of coexistence of the past and the present 
[convergence and division]; and finally in the form of a circle of the 
presents which pass and which coexist in relation to the 
object=x.”64 
 But it is not as though the past and the present move in a closed circle. On 
the one hand, to conceive them as moving in a closed circle is a 
philosophical error. On the other hand, the circle is dependent upon an 
affirmation; whether enough chance is affirmed in the organization of time 
in its entirety. It is this affirmation which is imperceptible in the circle, but is 
already everywhere dispersed in it because there is nothing like the Identity 
of the past, neither does the conditioned itself resemble what conditions it, 
or that which it is in relation to so as to become conditioned as such. Deleuze 
makes such arguments convincing only from the third synthesis of time. In 
order to transition away from the past, which is not primary in the order of 
time, we must remember that to ground is to determine the indeterminate, 
with the indeterminate already installing itself imperceptibly in the second 
repetition. As I have argued above, the continuum of the ground is “bent 
and must lead us toward a beyond, so the second synthesis of time points 
beyond itself in the direction of a third which denounces the illusion of the 
in-itself as still a correlate of representation.”65 It is the re-turning toward the 
virtual which splits the image in two. We take the direction of the future by 
way of the question. From the perspective of third repetition, we no longer 
trace the ground in relation to the grounded, but groundlessness as now 
infusing the ground as the reason behind the differentiation of beings.  
 The third repetition splits the image in two unequal halves. Deleuze 
presents this time as out of joint because the before of the being of the past 
along with the conditioned, and what comes after, do not coincide. There is 
something unequal introduced in the second repetition which cannot be 
made in conformity with it. The ground strangely bending in another 
direction after it culminates in a freeze-frame or a frozen image, is the 
opening up of the freedom of the future; the beginning of time as opening 
up the becoming-world yet again for another time. Deleuze, hence, writes 
that,  
time out of joint means demented time or time outside of the curve 
which gave it a god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, 
freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to 
movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty 
and pure form. Time itself unfolds (that is, apparently ceases to be a 
circle) instead of things unfolding within it (following the overly 
simple circular figure).66  
I have already argued how this image is split in two by discussing the 
continuity of becoming in relation to the caesura. The articulation of the 
third repetition as a pure order of time is a precise one, because, with it, we 
S a n j a  D e j a n o v i c  |  9 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 1 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.682 
no longer have the complex of virtual events unfolding in time, but time 
itself unfolding as a function of the caesura. The caesura is the instant that 
disjoints time, or distributes the before and the after of time in such a way as 
to render events kinds of verbs or becomings, moving in two directions 
simultaneously. By borrowing Hölderlin’s aphorism that time no longer 
rhymes, Deleuze wants to demonstrate that there is something unequal to 
the ground, which nevertheless configures it, all the while dissolving it.  
Overturning its own ground, time is defined not only by a formal 
and empty order but also by a totality and a series. In the first 
place, the idea of a totality of time must be understood as follows: 
the caesura, of whatever kind, must be determined in the image of 
a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a 
whole.67  
According to Deleuze, the pure event of the third repetition draws together 
the other syntheses of time, which are conceived now from the perspective 
of the caesura. It draws them together, however, without necessarily doing 
away with their distinct operations. It is better to say, then, that the other 
syntheses are explained from the perspective of the third, because the third 
is that which “makes” the difference. This is what Deleuze means when he 
argues that, “in a certain sense, the ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, 
therefore encompasses everything; while in another sense it destroys 
everything; and in yet another sense selects among everything.”68 Along 
with the repeater of the present and the repetition of the past, there is that 
which is repeated in them; the eternal return of the future. The eternal return 
unfolds the circle so as to form a straight line, or raises the ground never to 
see the same return, by rendering repetition for itself adequate to difference 
in-itself. Since the third repetition distributes difference, the other repetitions 
arise in relation to it, while also being displaced by it. Only difference in-
itself returns in the empty form of time. The other syntheses are displaced by 
it because the eternal return introduces a differentiation that each time 
distributes the being of the past anew, giving way to the creation of the 
novel in the present. This each time means that the other repetitions do not 
return, only the differentiation that disjoints time returns. It returns as that 
which dissolves the ground into groundlessness. It is the essential 
formlessness which insinuates itself in every form, thereby, resisting the 
appropriation of the event in representational models towards which it 
tended. 
 I have argued that the eternal return displaces the being of the past 
because it is already involved in it. With the culmination of the virtual 
events of the past, the line reverses itself, illuminating the pathway anew, in 
reverse, showing the third repetition to have been there all along, 
configuring the past itself. To begin with, the third repetition is disguised in 
the events of the being of the past, which, in accordance with the operation 
of the past, become centers of convergence. But these centers of convergence 
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bear the differentiation, since the being of the past does not itself resemble, it 
is not the same as the divergent series of actualizations, neither do the events 
that configure it, the levels of the past, bear the same intensity, even though 
they replay a complex theme, a life, a rhythm.69  
This is our first hint of differentiation. Deleuze refers to such a disguise 
of the third in the second repetition as the dark precursor. The dark 
precursor is the disguised differentiation, or that which makes the 
difference, in the second synthesis of time. The concept of the dark precursor 
can appear mysterious if we do not grasp the simplicity of the eternal return, 
or more importantly, if we do allow that time unfolds as a function of the 
caesura, because of which every determination carries along with it 
indetermination. So why is the precursor dark in the second repetition? The 
precursor is dark in the second repetition, because it is “covered by the 
phenomena it induces within the system”; it is covered over primarily by the 
centers of convergence that compose the past, which such centers of 
convergence being the creation of a world.70 But the point is that the second 
repetition is induced from the perspective of the caesura, even if this is not 
apparent to begin with. In reverse, each center of convergence will be shown 
as bearing a differentiation that leads to a divergence. Each repetition will 
become disjointed, showing now only difference in-itself. When traversing 
the entirety of the transcendental field, the difficult question is always 
whether it is divergence or convergence that is primary. Deleuze’s most 
radical argument is that divergence instigated by differentiation is primary 
in the order of time. It is, as we have noted, that which gives birth to time—
not only by raising events to the surface, but in dissolving the ground with 
the difference made. With the being of the past “the dividing in two, this 
differentiation, did not reach completion […] because time rolled itself up, 
and its two aspects relaunched themselves into the circuit whose poles they 
recharged while blocking up the future.”71 When tracing the theatre of the 
virtual, we do not simply move through the different levels which unfold in 
time. We move back and forth, from the centers of convergence, the virtual 
events, along the lines of actualization, and back again, until the entirety of 
the circuit (of the virtual and the actual) plays itself out or plays out a 
becoming.  
Now, in contrast, the dividing in two [of the virtual and the actual] 
can come to completion, but precisely on the condition that one of 
the two tendencies leaves the crystal, through the point of flight. 
[…] Everything that has happened falls back into the crystal and 
stays there: this is all the frozen, fixed, finished-with and over-
conforming roles that the characters have tried in turn.72  
What exits this crystal, thereby shattering or fracturing the point of view, is 
the differentiation of the virtual, since it is in itself unequal to the past on the 
whole. It is released from imprisonment in the other repetitions, reverses 
itself, and in the process dissolves them, never to see them return in the 
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same configuration. The unequal emerges, from the theatre in which the 
combination of the past is configured, as the future: “It creates this future as 
a bursting forth of life. […] One leaves the theatre to get to life, but one 
leaves imperceptibly, on the thread of the stream, that is, of time. It is by 
leaving it that time gives itself a future.”73 The thread traced is the ultimate 
differentiation that opens onto the future. The eternal return of difference is 
the highest object of affirmation, because therein lies our unbound joy 
together with the greatest freedom: to begin the story of time anew with the 
dissolution of time. Hölderlin captures the dissolution of time and the birth 
of a life anew essential to events, when writing the following:  
Thus dissolution as necessity, from the viewpoint of ideal memory, 
becomes as such the ideal object of a newly unfolded life, a look 
back at the path that had to be traversed from the beginning of the 
dissolution up to where out of this new life a memory occurs of 
what was dissolved, and out of that, as explanation and unification 
of the gap and the contrast that occurs between what is new and 
the past, the memory of the dissolution can follow. The ideal 
dissolution is fearless. The beginning—and endpoint are already 
posited, found, secured; therefore this dissolution is also more 
certain, more irresistible, bolder; and thus it presents itself as what 
it actually is, as a reproductive act whereby life runs through all of 
its points and, to acquire the sum total, lingers over none, dissolves 
itself in each, to produce itself in the next.74 
 
Concluding Thoughts on Events 
In this paper I have explored the virtual and the actual, particularly through 
Deleuze’s philosophy of time, so as to focus in on what is at the heart of 
events, what it is that allows us to oust the verb to be through the 
philosophical concept of event. In the first part of this paper, I placed the 
emphasis on the way in which Nietzsche, as a thinker of univocal being, 
contributes to Deleuze’s articulation of being as becoming. Such an 
articulation, I argued, is dependent on the eternal return being both an 
instant and a continuation of the stream of becoming. If the eternal return is, 
together, instant and a singular becoming, or more to the point, a variation 
in the stream of becoming, then, a singular event enfolds precisely that, the 
instant of differentiation, which makes of it a becoming that moves in two 
directions simultaneously; the event is always, as Deleuze tells us, that 
which happened and what is about to happen. To grasp these two 
directions, or lines that compose the nature of events, I took up the relation 
of the actual and the virtual, particularly by dealing with some of the core 
complexities of the three syntheses of time. I argued that in there are two 
paths through which the complex entanglement of the actual and the virtual 
can be approached, and these two paths, away and toward the virtual, 
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happen at once and indeed oust the verb “to be” in a double sense; on the 
one hand, the present-being is ousted in the same process it is constituted, 
and in the other direction, the being of the past, or what is, is perpetually 
dissolved with the being of becoming which introduced the differentiation 
as the heart of a singular event. Or, alternatively, the actualization of the 
virtual on the one hand, and the dissolution of the actual object as it becomes 
indiscernible from the virtual on the other, are two paths laid out at once, 
even while the sort of process implied by each is different. Again, the 
asymmetrical processes demonstrate that in one direction the event is 
actualized, while in the other, toward undoing, it is counter-actualized, or 
that which cannot be actualized as such. Perhaps the most important theme 
discussed in this paper is the role that the differential relation plays in 
Deleuze’s philosophy of events. This theme prompts us to ask how it is that 
the third synthesis of time serves as a kind of selective test whereby actual 
beings become indiscernible from the virtual when affirmed as events. This 
does not mean that actual beings are inconsequential or have no role to play 
in creating whatsoever, but precisely the opposite. To affirm a being in its 
becoming, as event, is the ethics of events. It is to dissolve a world, a world 
which is not something external, above, or beyond, but a bloc of becoming, 
so as to make it anew at a higher level of intensity. It is to breathe new life 
into it, again. 
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